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INTRODUCTION

The modest aim of this piece is to supply some historical
background to the other contributions to this Symposium. The modern
American law school curriculum is the product of a few but critical
choices of design, some of them over a century old. In this Article, I
seek to (1) outline how the basic structure and content of the modern
American law school curriculum came into being and what were the
main competitors that curriculum displaced; (2) describe some of the
ways in which the curriculum's basic structure and content have
changed since its inception; and (3) point to some of the main sources
and motors of change.
I. ORIGINS OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE MODERN
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM

The American law school-in the basic shape we recognize it
today-originated with the model of legal education that President
Charles W. Eliot and Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell
established at Harvard in 1870. At first, Harvard's model seemed as if
it might fail: the school had lost enrollments and had to make its way
against rival models and hostile critics. By 1900, however, Harvard's
success was assured. Its example-sometimes transmitted by
Harvard's own former faculty as pro-consular deans, such as William
Keener at Columbia and Joseph Beale at Chicago-spread to other
leading law schools between 1895 and 1925; and between 1925 and
1950 virtually every full-time university-based law school in the
country had adopted the Harvard model's basic elements. This story of
convergence on a uniform model is all the more remarkable when one
considers that all of these law schools were preparing their students
for a wide variety of roles and careers in the United States' highly
stratified and segmented legal profession.
A. The Bedrock: The HarvardTemplate and Its Rivals
In the period of its adoption, Harvard's model was distinctive
in both structure and content.1

1.
The best source on Harvard remains ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983) (providing a general history of law
schools, and especially discussing the influence of Harvard Law School on the development of
legal education). Much valuable additional material is in WILLIAM LAPIANA, LOGIC AND
EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994) (discussing the origins of modern
American legal education, especially the influence of Christopher Columbus Langdell).
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1. Structure
Harvard instituted a three-year curriculum of courses to be
taken in a prescribed sequence, with all first-year and most secondyear courses required, along with examinations in all courses and a
high flunk-out rate for those who failed them. (This replaced the
casual system in which students could casually drop in, attend a
course of lectures, and then drop out.) Harvard also led the way to
making law a post-graduate education by requiring (starting in 1895)
a college B.A. as a precondition to admission. Finally, it replaced the
usual cadre of law teachers of the time-part-time practitioners and
retired judges-with full-time law professors. The professors were
freed from the demands of practice-although some, such as James
Barr Ames, had no practice experience to start with-and received
salaries adequate to fund careers as scholars and teachers.
2. Content
Except for Criminal Law (a first-year required course) and
Constitutional Law (a third-year elective), the Harvard curriculum
was made up entirely of private-law subjects. From 1889 to 1890, for
example, the required first-year curriculum consisted of Property,
Contracts, Torts, Civil Procedure, and Criminal Law. During the
second-year, students could choose five from among seven courses:
Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, Quasi-Contracts, Evidence,
Equity, Advanced Property, Sales, and Trusts. In the third-year,
students could select five or six courses from among Agency,
Constitutional
Law,
Equity
Jurisdiction,
Partnership
and
Corporations, Suretyship and Mortgages, Federal Jurisdiction, the
2
Law of Persons, Conflicts, and Legal History.
The Harvard brand eventually came to be largely identified
with one of its innovations, the "case method": Socratic inquiry
directed at large classes of students primed with reading appellate
cases, collected in "casebooks" edited by the faculty. Since Harvard
aimed to be a national school, recruiting from and sending its
graduates out to practice in every region, it taught (and by so doing
hoped to help create) a generic "common law." The cases were not
confined to particular jurisdictions but drawn from many different
states and the federal system, and in the early decades of casebook
editions, most cases came from the "mother jurisdiction," England.

2.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY CATALOGUE,

1889-90: THE LAW SCHOOL, 191-92 (Cambridge,

Charles W. Sever 1889). I have slightly altered the names of some courses to convey their content
to the modern reader.
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As the case method spread, it eventually displaced its chief
rivals; namely, lecturing to students and calling upon them to "recite"
their knowledge of passages from legal treatises. One of the reasons
for the case method's success (besides its evident pedagogic virtues-it
encouraged active rather than passive learning, and it tested that
learning through participation in dialogue as well as exams) was that
published casebooks gave novice teachers a ready-made, off-the-rack
set of teaching materials and method of instruction. Law professors
rarely emerged from a background of scholarship; yet the casebooks
ensured that they did not need to know their subject well-either to be
learned in its literature or to be an expert in the principles underlying
it-to make a successful start as a case law teacher. Another reason
the case method succeeded was that it proved adaptable to many
different approaches to law. Langdell himself wanted to use cases to
illustrate the small number of basic "principles" underlying fields of
doctrine: the casebooks would reveal the historical processes by which
those principles had evolved to their modern forms and would also
provide students the primary examples ("specimens") through which
they could induce the basic principles for themselves. But Langdell's
successors as case method teachers, even his own colleagues, rapidly
abandoned the aims of using cases either to illustrate doctrinal history
or to extrapolate principles, and instead treated the cases simply as
means of exercising mental muscles and teaching legal reasoninghow to "think like a lawyer."
By the 1920s and 1930s, Legal Realist law teachers used cases
largely as storehouses of facts about disputes and treated the actual
opinions (except for those of a handful of judge-heroes) as examples of
unsatisfactory formalist analysis, prompting the students to craft
context- and policy-based rationales that would provide better bases
for decisions. This use of cases continues today.
B. The ChiefRivals of the HarvardSchool
The diffusion of casebooks and case method teaching also
indirectly contributed to the triumph of the "pure law" private-law
curriculum over the public-law, interdisciplinary, and theoretical
approaches of Harvard's chief rivals. These alternative curricula all
resembled one another, in that their aims were to educate publicly
minded lawyers as well as private practitioners-lawyer-statesmen
and public civil servants capable of large-minded reasoning about
issues of constitutional structure and legal policy, viewed in
comparative and historical perspective. They all recognized the
obvious fact that, in America, people trained as lawyers had tended to
dominate high legislative and executive as well as judicial offices and
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had played leading roles in civic affairs. The alternatives came in
several varieties, with differing sources and content.
1.Education in Statesmanship
The first generation of American public-law curricula combined
two models attractive to founding-era lawyer-statesmen and their
immediate successors. The first model was designed for the lawyer as
policy scientist, who modernizes the law to bring it into harmony with
the needs of a liberal commercial society. This model was brilliantly
developed in the eighteenth-century Scottish School of Jurisprudence,
Moral Philosophy and Political Economy of Adam Smith, David Hume,
and their colleagues, who called it the Science of the Legislator, or
Science of Legislation. 3 The second model was designed for a kindred
but more ancient spirit: the liberal-humanist ideal of the Ciceronian
orator-statesman, the fearlessly independent spokesman for
4
republican liberty.
Both models called for education in political economy,
American and comparative constitutional government, the Law of
Nature and of Nations, comparative law, and Roman law and legal
history, as well as education in common law, equity, and pleading.
Thomas Jefferson's notes on teaching law at Virginia, for example,
proposed a curriculum of the "common and statute law, that of the
chancery, the laws feudal, civil, mercatorial, maritime and of nature
and nations; and also the principles of government and political
economy." 5 Although there was not much student demand for broad
liberal legal education, 6 over time its proponents produced a
distinguished public-law literature, including the treatises of

3.
See KNUD HAAKONSSEN, THE SCIENCE OF A LEGISLATOR (1981) (analyzing Adam Smith's
ideas about legal criticism and natural jurisprudence); DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF
LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1989) (discussing

the history of the increasing importance of the law jurists' writing on common law and legislative
policy in eighteenth-century Britain).
4.
See Stephen Botein, Cicero as a Role-Model for Early American Lawyers, 73 CLAsSICAL
J. 313 (1978) (discussing Cicero's influence on New England lawyers during the Revolutionary
period and after).
5.
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 231 (Richard Hofstadter &
Wilson Smith eds., 1961).
6.
Columbia's experience was typical: its original 1857 plan for a Jurisprudence
curriculum included Modern History, Political Economy, Natural and International Law, and
Civil and Common Law. By the following year it was clear that in order to attract any students
the course would have to be pruned back to "those branches of Municipal Law, usually and
appropriately pursued for obtaining a license to practice," with the hope that occasional lectures
in the "kindred branches" or "superadded Studies" might be offered as an extra sweetener once
the students had been drawn in. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW
OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 28 (1955).
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DuPonceau, St. George Tucker, Story, Sedgwick, Cooley, Dillon,
Pomeroy, and Tiedemann, among others.
2. Law as Policy Science
Later in the century, innovators at American schools continued
to look to Europe for curricular inspiration. The models were largely
German (and sometimes French) schools of public administration.
When Woodrow Wilson was asked to design a new law school for
Princeton in 1890, he rejected the Harvard template, wanting
not a duplicate of those [law schools] already in full blast all over the country, but an
institutional law school, so to speak, in which law shall be taught in its historical and
philosophical aspects, critically rather than technically, and as if it had a literature
besides a court record, close institutional connections
as well as litigious niceties,-as it
7
is taught in the better European universities.

The Princeton school's first chair was to be in public law, which
included Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, International Law,
General Jurisprudence, History of Law, History of Legal Philosophy,
Public Corporations, and Conflict of Laws.
The Princeton school never materialized, but its planned
content was not unique. At Columbia, Francis Lieber and his
successor John Burgess, both German-educated, also aimed to
integrate the study of private law with public law and political
science. Burgess founded the School of Political Science at Columbia in
1880, designed to train graduates for professional public service. He
hoped to recruit law students to his program because he believed "the
lawyers are the rulers of the country."8 This plan failed when Deans
Theodore Dwight and his successor, the Harvard-trained William
Keener, refused to add courses like Administrative Law and
Comparative Law to the regular law school curriculum; they insisted
that they had to be either optional electives or part of a graduate
program. Burgess's school became a graduate program for academics
rather than a professional school, though many law students
eventually cross-registered in its courses. 9

7.
Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Albert Shaw (Nov. 3, 1890), in THE PAPERS OF
WOODROW WILSON, 1890-1892, at 63 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1969).
8.
Alexa S. Bator, Public Law and Legal Education in the Nineteenth Century: The
Founding of Burgess' School of Political Economy at Columbia (Fall 1996) (unpublished student
paper, on file with the Yale Law Library) (emphasis in original).
9.
On Columbia, see GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 6, at 85-89, 95-97,167-68, for a discussion
of the school's attempts to integrate non-traditional courses into the law student's curriculum.
See also the illuminating paper by Bator, supra note 8.
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3. "Social" Law and Progressive Economics

Burgess and Wilson turned out to be transitional figures. After
1900, the content of the alternative public-law curriculum was further
transformed by new powerful intellectual currents and by legal
changes on the ground. The most influential new ideas came from the
"social law" movement. In Duncan Kennedy's excellent summary:
The inventors of the "social" include Jhering, Ehrlich, Gierke, Geny, Saleilles,
Duguit, Lambert, Josserand, Gounot, Gurvitch, Pound, and Cardozo. They had in
common with the Marxists that they interpreted the actual regime of the will theory
[the individualist basis of "formalist" or "Classical" legal thought, that private law is
designed to help individuals realize their freely-willed ends] as an epiphenomenon in
relation to a "base," in the case of the Marxists, the capitalist economy, and in the case
of the social, "society" conceived as an organism. The idea of both was that the will
theory in some sense "suited" the socio-economic conditions of the first half of the
nineteenth century. But the social people were anti-Marxist, just as much as they were
anti-laissez faire. Their goal was to save Liberalism from itself.
Their basic idea was that the conditions of late nineteenth-century life represented
a social transformation, consisting of urbanization, industrialization, organizational
society, globalization of markets, all summarized in the idea of "interdependence."
Because the will theory was individualist, it ignored interdependence and endorsed
particular legal rules that permitted anti-social behavior of many kinds. The crises of
the modern factory (industrial accidents) and the urban slum (pauperization), and later
the crisis of the financial markets, all derived from the failure of coherently
individualist law to respond to the coherently social needs of modern conditions of
interdependence.
From this "is" analysis, they derived the "ought" of a reform program, one that was
astonishingly successful and globalized even more effectively than classical legal
thought, through many of the same mechanisms, but also because the social became the
ideology of many third-world nationalist elites. There was labor legislation, the
regulation of urban areas through landlord/tenant, sanitary, and zoning regimes, the
regulation of financial markets, and the development of new institutions of
international law ....
Many advocates of the social argued that various groups within
the emerging interdependent society, including, for example, merchant communities
and labor unions, were developing new norms to fit the new "social needs." These norms,
regarded as "valid" "living law," rather than deduction from individualist postulates,
should, and also would, in this "legal pluralist" view, be the basis for legislative,
administrative and judicial elaboration of new rules of state law. 10

Another was the closely-related parallel development of a new
Law and Economics rooted in the historical and comparative study of
institutions. "Historical" or "institutional" legal-economists, most of
them German, undertook to rationalize legal forms and institutions
such as property, contracts, torts, and varieties of labor servitude, by
reference to their economic functions and purposes, which varied over
time and across societies. Like the "social" lawyers, they also had a

10. Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max
Weber's Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034-35 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
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normative program, which was the reform of dysfunctional or archaic
law and its modernization to suit the needs of industrial society.
Generally they thought this goal best accomplished by a mandarinate
of economically trained specialists-expert
administrators or
economically sophisticated judges. In the United States their ideas
were taken up by an influential group of economists, such as
Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, Richard T. Ely, and Walton H.
Hamilton,1 1 who supplied intellectual inspiration to the Progressive
movement and whose ideas influenced reform-minded lawyers and
law teachers.
Most important, as Kennedy notes, Progressive reformersoften educated in the new currents of European ideas and having
observed or studied European experiments-were beginning to initiate
statutory reforms in the service of social law visions: factory
inspection, food and drug regulation, maximum hours labor laws,
workers' compensation systems, railroad rate regulation, child labor
abolition, resource conservation planning, public health regimes,
"purity" crusades against the polluting effects of vice, alcohol and
obscenity, progressive taxation of income, and many more. These
reform efforts involved enacting new statutes, setting up new
administrative agencies to administer them, and litigating to repel
Constitutional challenges to the new statutes and judicial evisceration
of regulatory regimes.
All these new intellectual approaches and concrete reform
activities created large bodies of new law outside the Harvard canon of
traditional subjects and raised questions of how or whether law
schools, which for prestige reasons were one after another converting
to the Harvard model, would be prepared to take them on board. Early
signs were not promising. Probably the best-known story is that of the
new University of Chicago, where the great German-born scholar
Ernst Freund, the author of pioneering treatises on Legislation,
Administrative Law and the Police Power, 12 had set up courses in
Legislation, Administrative Law, Relation of State to Industry, Labor
and Capital, and Railroad Regulation. In a famous episode, Harvard
11.

The best work I have come across on the German historical school is HEATH PEARSON,

ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMISTS' NEW SCIENCE OF LAW, 1830-1930 (1997)

(analyzing the centrality of law in the literature of nineteenth-century historical and
institutional economics). For the Americanized versions of their ideas, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993 (1990).
12.

ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION: AN ESTIMATE OF RESTRICTIVE

AND CONSTRUCTIVE FACTORS (1917) (critiquing the way statutes are made); ERNST FREUND ET.
AL., THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1923) (presenting a historical survey of
American administrative law); ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904) (discussing the interplay between the police power and
individual rights).
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Dean Ames refused to allow his colleague Joseph H. Beale to go to
Chicago as its new dean unless the school were purged of the
"polluting presence" of Freund's public law and policy courses, and
until he had Chicago's assurance that only "pure law" would be taught
in the school. 13 At the same time, Dean Ames strenuously resisted
President Eliot's attempts to create a track at Harvard's own law
school for students preparing for diplomatic or civil service careers,
insisting that such courses belonged in a separate school of political
14
science.
Ironically then, just as Progressivism was beginning to provide
careers and motivation for "social" lawyers, and as an ancillary
discipline in institutional economics was starting to give their work
intellectual content, the law schools were seized by internal reform
movements that sought to expel or exclude all of those ideas as
irrelevant to the study of "pure law." By 1920, policy studies in law
schools were even more peripheral than they had been in 1870, having
been driven out by the Langdellian private-law case method
curriculum. For as the Harvard model proliferated, it exiled or
marginalized both the traditional and the newer (Progressive)
alternative curricula, sending them off to separate departments or
confining them to the law schools' graduate programs. What the
Harvard model tended to drive out was not only almost anything that
smacked of public law (legislation or administration, law as part of a
framework of government, international law), but also legal theory
and jurisprudence, as well as anything that provided overviews,
perspectives, or comparisons about law-courses in the "elements of
law," Roman law, comparative law, legal history, or the sociology of
legal institutions or law-in-action. Looking back on this period, Karl
Llewellyn recalled that when
[William A.] Keener was called to Columbia in 1890 to put that law school on a footing
worthy of a great University he brought with him two policies: (1) "The" case system ... (2) All that noise which is not "law" must go out; a "law" curriculum must
cast out Ishmael.... Columbia had therefore to amputate from any official "law"connection what became the Department of Political Science. Thus the Roman Law
Perspective of a Munroe Smith, the scholarship and vision of a [Frank J.] Goodnow
[along with Freund one of the pioneers of American administrative law scholarship], the
power and range of our greatest international lawyer, John Bassett Moore, flourished
not within the law curriculum, nor for it, but across the barbarian border ....
In 1915,
when, already our foremost jurisprude, [Roscoe Pound] became Dean at Harvard Law
School, he deliberately took his own Jurisprudence course out of the undergraduate[law

13.

On this episode, see WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF

ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 47-59 (1982). On Freund's work at Chicago generally, see Paul
Carrington, The Missionary Diocese of Chicago, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 467 (1994).
14. Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practicein the Age of American Enterprise:
1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 75 (Gerald Geison

ed., 1983).
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school] curriculum. He kept it out, lest the bulk of graduates be distracted - or
contaminated. 15

The single-minded reductionism of the Harvard missionaries
needs some explanation, and the explanation is not what might
appear to be the obvious one, that these proponents of the Harvard
School were parochial and anti-intellectual philistines who thought
anything that was not black-letter law must be bunk. They were
certainly not this, but neither were they conservatives defending
classical-individualist-private-law will theory from Progressive social
lawyers. Indeed, the founding generation of Harvard scholars were
among the most cosmopolitan and interdisciplinary scholars in
America. The canonical curriculum and its casebooks-Contracts,
Property, Torts, Civil Procedure-were the product of a transatlantic
collaboration with English analytical jurists (William Anson, A.V.
Dicey, Frederick Pollock, William Markby, T.E. Holland) who were
determined to construct from the ruins of the collapsing forms of
action a coherent science of substantive principles. This enterprise in
turn borrowed heavily from European legal scholarship, using the
categories of modernized Roman Law jurisprudence. 16 Harvard
professors including Ames, James Bradley Thayer, John Chipman
Gray, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Roscoe Pound all did
pioneering work in legal history and theory. Gray's Nature and
Sources of the Law (1909) 17 is often credited with being one of the
forerunners of the Legal Realist movement, and Pound was one of the
luminaries of the "social law" movement, the prophet of "sociological
jurisprudence," and the promoter of empirical "law-in-action" studies.
In politics they were mostly Mugwumps or moderate Progressives, not
laissez-faire constitutionalists; indeed Thayer and Holmes were the
two foremost critics of aggressive judicial striking-down of statutes.
Part of the reason for their single-mindedness about
curriculum was that, in an age of specialization, they were trying to
establish law as a distinctive discipline and autonomous technical
subject that was different from everything else in the academy. The
study of public law inevitably adulterated pure law with political
science, economics, and history, and was thus to be avoided. Also, the
public law subjects were politically controversial-professors could be
fired for taking positions on railroad regulation, the "trust" problem,

15. KARL LLEWELLYN, The Study of Law as a Liberal Art, in JURISPRUDENCE 375, 377-78
(1962) (emphasis in original).
16. The best recent treatment of the English side of this enterprise is NEIL DUXBURY,
FREDERICK POLLOCK AND THE ENGLISH JURISTIC TRADITION 185-283 (2004).
17. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909) (publishing a
series of lectures given at Columbia University in the spring of 1908).
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labor relations, or progressive taxation-issues the alumni and
trustees thought too left-wing.
But mostly, I think, Harvard's missionaries and epigones
pushed for their constricted curriculum simply because they had
become fanatically committed to the case method of teaching law
students as a uniquely rigorous and effective method, one they were
convinced took a full three years to master successfully. The case
method was just not suited to teaching about statutes or
administrative agency actions (except as these might appear
piecemeal in a case), or about the economics of rate-making or
antitrust regulation, or about courts in relation to other governmental
institutions, or empirical studies of law-in-action, or comparative,
historical or theoretical perspectives on law.
II. STABILITY AND CHANGE WITHIN THE CORE: ADDITIONS AND
INTERNAL TRANSFORMATIONS

A survey of catalogues over the twentieth century from six law
schools18 confirms that, at least in its outward skeletal form, the
Harvard-ized core curriculum has remained remarkably stable. The
basic structure is the same: a three-year post-graduate course with
regular examinations that is taught by a full time faculty and that
uses the case method as the primary means of instruction. 19 The
required first-year courses are largely the same today as in 1871,
except that beginning in the 1970s and 1980s many schools reduced
them from full-year to one-term courses.
The Harvard curriculum has undergone two major kinds of
change in the twentieth century. The first and most conspicuous
change is in the proliferation of electives-and the elimination of most
requirements-in the second and third years. The second and less
obvious, but more profound, changes have taken place in the content
of the canonical subjects.

18. The following generalizations about changes in course offerings are based on sampling
of law school catalogues in four private (Harvard, Stanford, Vanderbilt, Yale) and two public
(Michigan, Texas) university law schools at ten year intervals from 1890 to 1990. We (my
research assistants and I) went through the samples looking for first appearances of new courses
and for the appearance and disappearance of required courses. Had we had more time, we would
have liked to sample a much wider range of schools, including more non-elite schools and the
more experimental schools such as Chicago, Northeastern, Wisconsin, Buffalo, Antioch, and
George Mason.
19. This needs some qualification, since virtually every law school now relies on a brigade of
part-time adjuncts to do much of its teaching, especially in trial practice and the more
specialized aspects of commercial practice.
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A. Addition of Electives
Many of the public-law courses that had earlier been banished
from the standard law school curriculum in the early years of
Harvard's imperial spread found their way back into law school course
catalogues in the form of elective course offerings. These subjects
gradually crept back in to the law school curriculum, first as graduate
courses, then as third-year electives. Courses in regulated
industries-Insurance, Public Corporations, Railroad Law, etc. are
prominent among these. After the New Deal, some of the statutory
courses, such as Taxation, were promoted to the second-year and
achieved the status of semi-required subjects. Constitutional Law also
moved out of the third-year-elective outland to become a required
subject in the second or even the first year. Some of the more
experimental schools-frustrated with the continued privileging of
common law in a legal system dominated by statutes and agencieseventually moved public-law courses in Legislation, Administrative
Law, or Statutory Analysis into the heartland of the required firstyear. The earliest to do so were Yale and Columbia, which taught
regulated industries courses ("Public Control of Business," Yale called
it) to first-year students in the 1930s, at the height of the New Deal.
Despite the presence of Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, the
leading Administrative Law scholars in the country, Harvard only
moved its Administrative Law course out of the graduate program and
into the undergraduate program after 1930. At the height of the New
Deal Harvard added courses in Legislation, Taxation, Antitrust, and
Regulatory Law; otherwise, its settled, and almost entirely required
curriculum, was substantially unaffected by changing times. It was
not until much later, in the 1980s, that several other schools,
including Stanford, Georgetown, and Columbia (in a renewal), brought
statutory-administrative
courses into the required first-year
curriculum.
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Our six-school overview tells us (approximately 20 ) what types of
21
new courses were added to the curriculum and when.
1890: Insurance
1900: Regulated industries (public utilities, common carriers,
public corporations, etc.)
1920: Administrative Law (at Harvard, still a graduate course
until the 1930s)
1930: New Deal subjects: Anti-Trust, Federal Tax, Securities
1940: Labor Law, Family Law
1950: International Legal Studies, Comparative Law (e.g. Soviet
Law), Legal Process
1960 (late): Poverty Law, Urban Law
1970: Clinics; Law & Economics; Race & Law; Women & Law; Free
Speech, Civil Rights (as distinct courses); Environmental Law;
Crime and Society
1980: Legal history; law-and-other-social sciences (anthropology,
etc.); Children and the Law; Alternative Dispute Resolution
The patterns of change here are obvious enough. Most of the
additions through the 1940s track the proliferation of regulatory
statutes and agencies. The post-World War II curriculum also records
the new interest in international law and institutions and other
(especially rival) legal systems. The Warren Court, Rights Revolution,
and Great Society bring with them bodies of law on civil rights of
blacks and women, and poverty, cities and crime control. The New
Social Regulation brings the Clean Air and Clean Water Act and
environmental regulation generally.

20. As one might expect, there is some variation among the schools sampled. This
summarizes the general pattern. The tables of data on which the summaries are based are on file
with the Vanderbilt Law Review.
21. Some subjects dropped out of the curriculum: Equity (as a separate subject, though it
reappears in general courses on Remedies), Quasi-Contract (which is folded into the general
Contracts and Remedies courses), Mortgages, Suretyship, Bailments, Agency, and the Law of
Persons (whose most important components were split off into Corporations and Family Law).
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For the most, law schools seamlessly integrated these additions
into dominant methods of teaching. Law schools taught the public-law
subjects of the Progressive period, New Deal, and beyond as case
method subjects. Legislation was a course in judicial interpretation of
statutes. Administrative Law was a course in judicial review of
administrative action. Even Federal Taxation was taught from books
consisting mostly of appellate cases. The Legal Realists' attempt to
import other social sciences into law ended up as a sort of temporary
guest-worker program: Some social scientists were invited in, asked to
perform modest ancillary tasks, then sent back home. 22 "Cases on..."
became "Cases and Materials on..." with the materials consisting of
snippets of non-case descriptive matter.
Some of the added offerings, however, constituted genuine
innovations. The most important additions were clinical programs,
initially funded starting in 1968 by liberal grants from the Ford
Foundation. After their expulsion early in the century, courses giving
an overview of legal institutions and their functions also crept back
into the curriculum. The most famous of these courses was Harvard's
Legal Process course, which at the peak of its influence (1958-68) was
taught in at least forty-six law schools across the country, 23 and whose
ideas-in part perhaps because at the time the course was the only
source of general reflections on the legal system anywhere in the law
school classroom-had a pervasive effect on the law teachers, lawyers
and judges exposed to it.
The 1970s marked a new beginning (after the truncated Realist
experiments of the 1920s and 1930s) of the opening to other
disciplines-what Richard Posner has called "the decline of law as an
autonomous discipline" 24-especially to economics. This in turn led to
a significant further "academicizing" of the law teaching profession,
signaled by the elite schools' growing preference for new faculty with
Ph.D.s in other fields as well as law degrees, and their discounting of
25
practice experience.
22. The classic accounts of the truncated Realist experiments with integrating social
sciences in the 1920s and 1930s are LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986)
(describing the theories behind legal realism and the justifications given by its proponents
during the legal realist movements at Yale and Columbia) and JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995).

23.

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Historical and CriticalIntroduction, in

HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING

AND APPLICATION OF LAW xi, cxiv n.284 (1994, republishing the 1958 Tentative Edition).
24. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100
HARv. L. REV. 761, 761 (1987).

25. For recent data on the backgrounds of law school hires, see, e.g., Lawrence Solum, Legal
Theory
Blog,
May
17,
2006,
http:/lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/2006_05_01_lsolum_
archive.html#1 14129865560132000.
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B. Internal Transformations

As we might expect of a common-law-oriented system,
curricular change has occurred largely through changes in the content
of courses bearing the same names. To convey examples of how this
has worked, I have tracked the evolution of two such coursesConstitutional Law and Torts-by examining some of the major
casebooks in those fields.
1. Constitutional Law
Let us start with the first important book: Thayer's Cases on
ConstitutionalLaw (1895).26 Thayer sets what will thereafter be the
almost unvarying pattern by making the principal materials of his
book cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. No better example of
the distortions in emphasis caused by the case method could be
imagined than one reducing the study of constitutions to the judicial
branch, and to the work of one court at that. Still, to give him credit,
Thayer begins with a section on constitutional structure, with
emphasis on the emergence of the special role of the judiciary within
that structure. 27 This section, called "Written Constitutions in the
United States" begins with English background materials on colonial
charters, includes passages from Locke and jurists' commentary as
well as cases, and consists largely of early state cases on the scope and
functions of judicial review. What follows is a section on "Making and
Changing Written Constitutions," which deals extensively with state
constitutions (including excerpts therefrom) as well as the federal
constitution. 2 8 So far as I know, Thayer's is the last, as well as the
first, Constitutional Law casebook to deal at any length with state
constitutions and state-level judicial review.
Thayer's first substantive law section deals with Civil Rights
and Citizenship. 29 Thayer (1831-1902) had lived through the Civil
War, and the issues raised by slavery, secession and Reconstruction
were still foremost in his mind. The section contains some of the major
slavery cases, State v. Mann,30 Prigg v. Pennsylvania,31 Scott v.

26.

JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: WITH NOTES (1895).

27. Id. at 48. Two years earlier Thayer had published his path-breaking article on judicial
review, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV.
129 (1893).
28. THAYER, supra note 26, at 207.
29. Id. at 449.
30. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (1 Dev.) 263 (1829).
31. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
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Sandford,32 Lemmon v. People33 (an 1860 New York case on a petition
seeking to free slaves in transit through New York). 34 It also includes
a prosecution under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (United States v.
Rhodes),35 the Slaughter-house Cases,36 Bartemeyer v. Iowa (an 1873
case claiming prosecution under state liquor law violated defendant's
privileges and immunities), 37 Strauder v. West Virginia,38 the Civil
Rights Cases,39 People v. King (an 1888 New York case upholding as
valid exercise of the police power, against a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge, state law prohibiting racial discrimination in places of
public amusement), 40 and Lehew v. Brummel 41 (an 1890 Missouri case
upholding as valid exercise of police power state law requiring
segregation by race in schools). 42 It also contains several cases on the
citizenship of aliens and-Indians, Hurtado v. California (discussing
the "due process" clause as protecting general rule-of-law values, and
not precluding novel legislative experiments such as substitution of
indictment by information for grand jury), 43 and a handful of cases in
which businesses challenged regulations on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds. 44 Thayer further includes sections on the major powers of
government (the police power, eminent domain and taxation), 45 on
restrictions on state government power (ex post facto laws, laws
impairing contract, etc.), 46 a 500-page section on federal and state
commerce powers, 47 and finally, sections on money and weights and
48
measures, and powers to deal with war and insurrection.
For contrast, look at a casebook published twenty-two years
later: Emlin McClain, A Selection of Cases on Constitutional Law (2d
ed. 1909). 49 It contains large sections on what will become the primary
topics of the field until the 1960s-federal taxation and commerce

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).
THAYER, supra note 26, at 473-96.
United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866).
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129 (18 Wall.) (1873).
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
People v. King, 18 N.E. 245 (N.Y. 1888).
Lehew v. Brummell, 15 S.W. 765 (Mo. 1891).
THAYER, supra note 26, at 406-574.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
THAYER, supra note 26, at 575-620.
Id. at 693-1431.
Id. at 1433-1782.
Id. at 1783-2191.
Id. at 2192-2420.

49.

EMLIN McCLAIN, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1909).
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powers, as well as a big section on federal jurisdiction (later to be spun
off into a separate course on Federal Jurisdiction or Federal Courts).
To a modern reader's eye what is striking is that McClain includes
nothing on slavery except Robertson v. Baldwin (an 1897 case
regarding involuntary servitude of sailors).5 0 Though Lochner has
been decided, it only appears in the Appendix at the end. 5 1 Under the
"equal protection" heading, there is only one case (Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
involving discrimination against the Chinese); 52 on voting rights, also
53
but one case (Minor v. Happersett, involving women's right to vote);
under the Fourteenth Amendment, no race cases at all save United
States v. Cruikshank,54 though the Civil Rights Cases make a cameo
appearance in a footnote. 55 The great constitutional struggles that tore
the nation apart and their aftermath in Reconstruction seem in this
casebook to have dropped out of legal consciousness. Similarly, James
Parker Hall's treatise, ConstitutionalLaw (1923), gives one page each
56
to the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The Harvard scholars, however, preserved some memory of the
Good Old Cause. Eugene Wambaugh's Selection of Cases on
ConstitutionalLaw (four volumes, 1914-15)57 is a successor to Thayer's
book compiled by a Harvard colleague. 58 The longest section is on the
Commerce Clause in Volume 4 (about 200 pages), 59 but Volume 2,
though mostly about the Contracts Clause and Ex Post Facto Laws,
has a twenty-page section on the Bill of Rights. 60 Volume 3 is almost
entirely about the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and it does
include some slavery cases: Scott v. Sandford,61 then Osborn v.
Nicholson (an 1872 case on postwar validity of note in consideration of
sale of a slave),6 2 and Robertson v. Baldwin.63 It also contains a 1905
peonage case, Hodges v. United States (discussing a white gang that
prevents black laborers from reporting to work; no federal remedy). 64
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 782; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
McCLAIN, supra note 49, at 1260; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
McCLAIN, supra note 49, at 917; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

53.

MCCLAIN, supra note 49, at 974; Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).

54.
55.

MCCLAIN, supra note 49, at 35; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
MCCLAIN, supra note 49, at 37 n.1; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

56.

JAMES PARKER HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56-57, 66 (1923).

57.

EUGENE WAMBAUGH, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VOLS. 1-4 (1914-

58.
59.

THAYER, supra note 26.
WAMBAUGH, supra note 57, at 83-282.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 206-26.
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note

15).

57,
57,
57,
57,

at
at
at
at

491;
506;
509;
516;

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1872).
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
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Further, Volume 3 includes Bailey v. Alabama (criminalizing contract
breach violates the Thirteenth Amendment); 65 as well as a few equalprotection cases: Bradwell v. Illinois (holding that women are not
constitutionally entitled to admission to legal profession), 66 Minor v.
Happersett,67 McReady v. Virginia (holding that Indians not
naturalized are not citizens), 68 Presser v. Illinois (a non-incorporated
Second Amendment case); 69 a few due process cases, including
Hurtado v. California70 and Twining v. New Jersey (finding that
privilege against self-incrimination is not so vital as to be essential
element of constitutional due process). 71 Wambaugh also includes a
small section specifically on the Fourteenth Amendment and race
discrimination: United States v. Cruikshank,72 Strauder v. West
Virginia,73 Ex Parte Virginia,74 the Civil Rights Cases,75 Plessy v.
Ferguson,76 but that is all. There is a separate section on the Fifteenth
77
Amendment, but it only contains one case (United States v. Reese).
In the middle of what a later generation of lawyers was to call
"the Lochner Era," Lochner and cases like it-limiting state exercises
of the police power-are actually given a very low profile in
Wambaugh's casebook. 78 By this time Fourteenth Amendment limits
on the police power had earned their own section, but one whose cases
seem chosen more to illustrate that legislatures have broad discretion
to regulate and classify than that courts may stand in their way; for
example, the section includes Bartemeyer v. Iowa 79 (again), Barbier v.
Connolly (upholding fire regulations affecting laundries),8 0 Yick Wo v.
Hopkins (striking down discriminatory regulations of Chinese
laundries),8 1 Mugler v. Kansas (upholding state destruction of
distillers' property),8 2 Powell v. Pennsylvania (upholding regulation of

65.

WAMBAUGH, supra note 57, at 520; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note
WAMBAUGH, supra note

82.

57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,
57,

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

537; Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
541; Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
547; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
556; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
587; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
608; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
617; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
623; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
630; Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
634; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
645; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
788; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
701; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
651; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873).
656; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884).
659; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
665; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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margarine),8 3 some miscellaneous business regulation cases, Holden v.
Hardy (upholding maximum hours for miners),8 4 Jacobson v.
Massachusetts (upholding compulsory vaccinations);8 5 Lochner v. New
York (striking down maximum hours for bakers),8 6 but without the
dissent by Justice Holmes that later becomes famous; Noble State
Bank v. Haskell (holding that it is not a violation of due process for
state to mandate that banks must contribute to a deposit insurance
fund),8 7 and Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg (holding that it is not
a violation of due process for state to take away defense of
88
contributory negligence in setting up workers' compensation system).
Finally, Wambaugh's Volume 4 consists entirely of federal tax and
89
commerce power cases.
Noel T. Dowling, Cases on American ConstitutionalLaw (1937),
records a marked shift of emphasis at the height of the New Dealers'
struggle with the Supreme Court over the constitutionality of their
legislative initiatives. Dowling announces his intent to "build a course
in American Constitutional Law on the major, but by no means
exclusive, theme of the regulatory power of government, national and
state; to make the course reflect particularly the re-examination of
prior doctrines in the cases of recent years . ... "90 This book consists
almost entirely of commerce and tax cases. The organization is as
follows:
1.

2.

3.

Powers Delegated to the National Government
(regulation of commerce, taxing powers, dispose of
property of the United States, treaties) 91
Powers of States (over health, safety and security;
commerce and revenue; discrimination against
92
interstate commerce)
Limitations on Powers: 93
a. Due process
b. Procedure

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

WAMBAUGH, supra note 57, at 672; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).

89.

WAMBAUGH, supra note 57.

90.

NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vii (1937).

91.
92.
93.

Id. at 116-392.
Id. at 393-588.
Id. at 589-1096.

WAMBAUGH, supra note 57,
WAMBAUGH, supra note 57,
WAMBAUGH, supra note 57,
WAMBAUGH, supra note 57,
WAMBAUGH, supra note 57,

at 686;
at 694;
at 701;
at 707;
at 730;

Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571 (1915).
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Substance-includes Allgeyer v. Lousiana,94 Coppage
v. Kansas,95 Meyer v. Nebraska,96 Pierce v. Society of
the Sisters,97 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish98
d. Contracts clause
e. Equal Protection Clause-includes Strauder v. West
Virginia,99 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 10 0 Civil Rights
Cases,1 1 miscellaneous business cases, and Truax v.
10 2
Corrigan
What is left out, as usual, is as interesting as what is included.
Slavery dropped out as a topic, as did most of the Reconstruction race
cases. There are three free speech cases (Gitlow v. New York,' 0 3 De
Jonge v. Oregon'0 4 and Near v. Minnesota0 5), but not the great Holmes
dissent in Abrams v. United States 0 6 nor the Brandeis concurrence in
Whitney v. California0 7 that inspired the libertarian cases of the
future. The Eighteenth Amendment and the whole Noble Experiment
of Prohibition have left no traces here save a short note.1 08 Lochner v.
New York' 0 9 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital,1 0 the maximum-hours
and minimum-wage cases that most excited Progressive indignation,
are missing altogether. The federal spending power, on which much of
the New Deal's key legislation rested, is missing too.
By the time we reach Freund, Sutherland, Howe & Brown,
ConstitutionalLaw, Cases and Other Materials (2 vols., 1954), we see
some major changes in the canon."' The book begins much like
Thayer's, with a brief historical approach to judicial review and
c.

94.

Id. at 730; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).

95.
96.

DOWLING, supra note 90, at 736; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
DOWLING, supra note 90, at 790; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

97.

DOWLING, supra note 90, at 798; Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

98.

DOWLING, supra note 90, at 752; W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
DOWLING, supra note 90, at 1039; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).

99.

100. DOWLING, supra note 90, at 1053; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

101. DOWLING, supra note 90, at 589; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
102. DOWLING, supra note 90, at 1039; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (holding that a
state statute prohibiting an injunction against labor picketers deprived employer of his only
substantial remedy to protect his property).
103. Id. at 799; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
104. DOWLING, supra note 90, at 811; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
105. DOWLING, supra note 90, at 817; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
106. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
107. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring).
108. DOWLING, supra note 90, at 19 n.2.
109. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
110. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
111. PAUL A. FREUND, ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, MARK DEWOLFE HOWE & ERNEST J. BROWN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS VOLS. 1-2 (1954).
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federalism. 112 The following section concerns distribution of power
between the federal government and the states. 113 This section,
"National Power over the Economy," leads us from United States v.
E.C. Knight Co. (finding there is no national power to apply antitrust
laws to manufacturing) 114 through the cases striking down New Deal
legislation (United States v. Butler,115 Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 116) to
Wickard v. Filburn.117 Then follows a very long (250-page) section on
state taxing powers. 118 Volume 2 opens with "Liberty and Property."'1 9
This volume includes substantial sections on the Civil War
Amendments, civil rights, 120 and equal protection, 121 which the
decision in Brown v. Board of Education122 had brought into new
prominence; on freedom of speech and religion (170 pages);' 23 and on
constitutionalized fair procedure, especially in criminal cases, but also
including cases on legislative investigations, which had become salient
in the Cold War Red Scare. 124 The final part deals with International
25
and Military Relations.1
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law
(1986) registers the familiar canon of the present day. 126 Like Thayer
and his successors, the book begins with "The Role of the Supreme
Court in the Constitutional Scheme,"'127 Marbury v. Madison128 and
McCulloch v. Maryland,129 and an overview section on the powers of
the national Congress, 130 which takes us from the Marshall Court's
nationalizing decisions through United States v. E.C. Knight' 3 1 and

112. Id. at 3-198.
113. Id. at 199-292.
114. Id. at 199; United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
115. FRUEND ET AL., supra note 111, at 233; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).

116. FRUEND ET AL., supra note 111, at 220; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
117. FRUEND ET AL., supra note 111, at 276; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
118. FRUEND ET AL., supra note 111, at 488-726. This section is a special interest of Professor
Ernest Brown of Harvard, one of the casebook editors.
119. Id. at 729-1551.
120. Id. at 779-922.
121. Id. at 1470-1510.

122. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
123. FREUND ET AL., supra note 111, at 1253-1469.

124. Id. at 924-1142. These cases were a special interest of Mark deWolfe Howe, another of
the casebook's editors.
125. Id. at 1553-1750.
126. GEOFFREY R. STONE, LouIs M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V. TUSHNET,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986).

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1-114.
Id. at 18; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
STONE ET AL., supra note 126, at 48; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
STONE ET AL., supra note 126, at 115-248.
Id. at 139; United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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the great cases of the New Deal constitutional confrontation, to the
post-Civil Rights Act cases expanding the commerce power to regulate
discrimination by private actors (Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States,132 etc.). The next part involves the traditional federal v. state
133
powers over commerce cases, but is now only eight-six pages long.
There is then a new topic-"Distribution of National Powers" between
the legislative and executive branches-with cases on the
administrative state and foreign affairs. 134 A huge (255-page) part
follows on Equality: the law of racial inequality from slavery through
Reconstruction and Jim Crow to Brown to Northern desegregation
cases; a large section on gender inequality; then another on alienage,
and wealth. 13 5 The next part, entitled "Implied Fundamental
Rights,"'136 connects the substantive due process cases of (what is now
becoming generally known as) the "Lochner Era" with modern
substantive due process cases from Skinner v. Oklahoma 37 through
Roe v. Wade. 138 The next section dramatically illustrates how large a
topic the First Amendment's speech and religion clauses has become:
it consumes 500 pages. 139 The book concludes with a part on the
140
Contracts and Takings Clauses.
Our final exhibit is Brest, Levinson, Balkin & Amar's Processes
of Constitutional Decisionmaking (4th ed., 2000).141 All the books we
have examined from Thayer onwards contained introductory historical
sections, but this book moves history from the prelude to the center of
the story: it thoroughly historicizes the subject. The editors are
explicit about why they do this: they wish to relativize the present by
showing that "notions of what constitutes a good or persuasive
constitutional argument have changed and will continue to change
over time," as have methods of interpretation such as textualism and
originalism; they want to teach that changes in constitutional law are
"deeply connected to changes in political and social life;" and they seek
to make a moral point, that the acceptability of an argument or
position to the legal establishment of an age does not certify its moral

132. STONE ET AL., supra note 126, at 187; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964).
133. STONE ETAL., supra note 126, at 249-338.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 339-434.
Id. at 435-690.
Id. at 691-924.
Id. at 751; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
STONE ETAL., supra note 126, at 854; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
STONE ETAL., supra note 126, at 925-1426.
Id. at 1427-66.

141. PAUL BREST, STANFORD LEVINSON, J.M.BALKIN & AKHIL REED AMAR, PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2000).
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worth or dispense with the need for independent critical judgment, as
is illustrated by generations of well-trained and conscientious lawyers'
participation in a system of laws upholding slavery. 142 True to its
promise, the book opens with a 400-page historical section. This
section contains chapters on the Bank of the United States (as a case
study), the Marshall Court, the Taney Court and the Civil War, and
Reconstruction to the New Deal (which is split evenly between the law
of race relations and the "Heyday of Judicial Activism" in the
regulation of economic activity-of which Lochner v. New York143 is
the leading illustration). 144 The book then moves on to "Constitutional
Adjudication in the Modern World." 145 It opens with a (now rather
short) chapter on economic regulation and the commerce clause. The
large chapters here are "The Burden of History: The Constitutional
Treatment of Race-Brown in the Light of Reconstruction," Gender
Equality (which now has a chapter of its own), Implied Fundamental
Rights, and The Constitution and the Welfare State (dealing largely
with new-property rights and the constitutionality of conditions on
spending).
Interestingly, some topics have disappeared. The constitutional
law of free speech and religion, of criminal procedure, and of federal
jurisdiction have become topics so large as to have been broken off and
made into separate courses. The Takings Clause is mostly covered
these days in Property courses. As for the wheelhorses of the old-style,
pre-1970s Constitutional Law course-the large volume of cases on
state taxing powers and the commerce clause-they seem to have
vanished into the void.
2. Torts
Tracing changes in the Torts canon takes up much less space,
because the primary lines of the story are linear and easily
summarized. The first casebooks, like James Barr Ames, Select Cases
on Torts (1874), are entirely devoted to intentional torts: assault,
battery, imprisonment, trespass to real and personal property,
trespass on servants (actions like those for enticing away an employee,
or alienating a wife's affections), justifications or excuses for
trespasses, conversion and defamation.1 46 Ames's cases are almost all
English. Twenty-odd years after he published the first edition of his

142. Id. at xxxi-xxxii.
143. Id. at 337; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
144. BREST ET AL., supra note 141, at 1-400.
145. Id. at 401-1604.
146. JAMES BARR AMES, SELECT CASES ON TORTS (1874).
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text, Ames re-worked the casebook with his colleague Jeremiah Smith
to form A Selection of Cases on the Law of Torts (2d ed., two vols. 18931900).147 Volume 1 is much the same as the first edition, though it
adds a new intentional tort-malicious prosecution.1 48 The innovation
comes in Volume 2, which introduces both a section on negligencestandards of care, legal cause, contributory negligence-and a section
including a small category of strict liability torts (extra-hazardous
occupations, liability of animal owners, etc.). 149 It also adds chapters
on the torts of deceit and wrongful death, on private damage from
public nuisance, on immunities of certain officers, and on joint and
several liability.150 The cases are still predominantly English, but with
a healthy mixture of recent American state cases.
From then on the pattern of evolution is clear. Negligence
15
rapidly expands (to 374 pages in Pound's 1919 Torts casebook; ' to
almost 400 pages in Bohlen's of 1925152), while the intentional torts
shrink (to 146 pages in Bohlen; 53 a mere twenty-seven pages in
Pound 154); meanwhile the strict liability ("liability without fault," or
"unintended non-negligent interference") category becomes a
significant separate topic (100 pages in Pound; 155 eight-six pages in
Bohlen).' 56 The torts of deceit, malicious prosecution, defamation, and
interference with contractual relations, still take up half of these
books. 157 By the time we reach Shulman & James (1952),158 negligence
is the primary topic, 159 misrepresentation, 160 defamation' 6' and assault
and battery 162 have been moved to the back of the book, and there is a
new category, "Suppliers of Goods and Remote Contracts"' 63 that will,
of course, become products liability. Shulman and James' other

147. JAMES BARR AMES & JEREMIAH SMITH, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS

VOLS. 1-2 (2d ed. 1893-1900).
148. Id. at 550-594.
149. Id. at 139-433.
150. Id. at 434-570, 581-727.
151. ROSCOE POUND, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 38-412 (1919).
152. FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 190-347, 531-619 (2d ed. 1925).
153. Id. at 33-172.
154. POUND, supra note 151, at 10-27.

155. Id. at 413-512.
156. BOHLEN, supra note 152, at 620-706.
157. Id. at 707-1128; POUND, supra note 151, at 530-1022.
158. HARRY SHULMAN & FLEMING JAMES, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS

(2d ed. 1952).
159. Id. at
160. Id. at
161. Id. at
162. Id. at
163. Id. at

1-451.
824-97.
898-1035.
1036-84.
718-823.
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innovations include a section on damages (property, personal injury,
death, loss of "relative rights")164 and-a reflection of the Yale authors'
immersion in legal realism and its institutional and empirical
studies-a chapter called 'Motor Vehicles-The Quest for a
Financially Responsible Defendant,"'165 which, as the name suggests, is
a discussion of policy alternatives to the tort system for automobile
accidents.
Franklin & Rabin continue and expand on these tendencies in
166
their revealingly titled Tort Law and Alternatives (1996 edition),
which again starts with negligence 167, leaves intentional torts to the
back of the book, contains separate sections on strict liability 16 8 and
products liability' 6 9, and has two institutional chapters: one on
damages and insurance 170 , the other a survey of alternatives to the
tort system 171 (notably workers' compensation and no-fault auto
accident schemes). The book also has a twenty-page section on the
172
economics of torts.
Two outliers whose schemata do not quite fit the regular
pattern are worth an extra comment here, as they illustrate some
roads not taken. The first is the great Evidence scholar John Henry
Wigmore's Torts casebook of 1912.173 Wigmore's book starts out by
dividing duties into voluntary and involuntary; thence into "recusable"
duties (contracts) and "irrecusable" duties (torts, quasi-contract); and
comments on the "chariness" of the Anglo-American tradition in
imposing irrecusable duties. 174 It organizes the subject of duties into
three "elements:" (1) the "damage element", (2) the "responsibility
element", and (3) excuses and justifications. 175 The "damage element"
turns out not to be about damages as such, though it does have
sections on pain and suffering, non-economic damage, wrongful death,
loss of consortium, and so forth; rather, it is about the varieties of
harms against which tort law provides a cause of action, and the types
of interests it protects. 176 (Note that it anticipates by some twenty-five
164. Id. at 452-519.
165. Id. at 654-98.
166. MARC FRANKLIN & ROBERT RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES (6th ed. 1996).
167. Id. at 31-505.
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169.
170.
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172.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
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807-83.
529-49.

173. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS: WITH NOTES, AND A
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES VOLS. 1-2 (1912).

174. Id. at 6-7.
175. Id. at 8-10.
176. Id. at 8-9.
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years Lon Fuller's famous re-analysis of contract law as protecting
distinct types of interests-expectation, reliance, restitution-through
its remedies in damages. 177) Wigmore here analyzes statutory as well
as common law actions. Under the second element, responsibility,
Wigmore covers the theory that justifies holding the defendant liable
for the harm by including in this section both causation and the
culpability of defendant's conduct (intentional, negligent, or acting "at
peril"). 178 The third element of excuse and justification classifies
defenses, excuses and privileges into such types as excuses based on
the plaintiffs own conduct (e.g. self-defense, contributory negligence,
defense, consent, plaintiff a law-breaker) 179 and various general
policies-"excuses based on paramount community interests
necessitating the plaintiffs sacrifice,"180 "policies seeking justification
in the necessities for ... economic improvements. . . [for] free social
rivalries ... [for] equality of opportunity in the acquisition of a tradal
reputation . . . [for] free discussion and criticism of character and
conduct.
,"181 [and for] "free resort to courts by parties for the
vindication of rights"; etc." 18 2 Most striking about this book is its
explicitly theoretical plan of organization, its extensive use of non-case
materials (many excerpts from such writers as Machiavelli, Herbert
Spencer, Burke, Brougham, Lieber, Bentham, Macaulay, Tocqueville),
its attention to comparative law, and its treatment of statutory
materials as on par with common law as a proper subject of legal
theory. Wigmore, in short, organizes the field by generalizing the
broad policies served by the rules. Legal education, I think, would
have developed very differently had it evolved along the paths blazed
83
by Wigmore.1
The other outlier is Leon Green's casebook of 1939: The
Judicial Process in Tort Cases. 8 4 Green was a leading legal realist
who believed that general doctrinal concepts (such as "due care,"

177. Lon Fuller & William Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J.
52 (1936) (discussing the purpose of awarding contract damages, especially the reliance interest).
178. WIGMORE, supra note 173, at 9.

179. Id. at 2-186.
180. Id. at 255-93.
181. Id. at 294-547.
182. Id. at 548-613.
183. In a remarkably prescient and comprehensive review of the curriculum in 1916,
Wigmore identified six important processes of thought to be learned from the study of law and
concluded that the case-method curriculum imparted only one of them, the "analytic" mode. The
other processes, to which he urged more attention in a fundamental revision of the curriculum,
were: the "historical," the "legislative," the "synthetic" (i.e., systematic legal theory), the
"comparative," and the "operative" (the study of law-in-action). John H. Wigmore, Novus
Methodus DiscendaeDocendaeque Jurisprudentiae,30 HARV. L. REV. 812, 822-27 (1916).
184. LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES (2d. ed. 1939).
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"proximate cause," and the like) were useless for describing actual
results of cases. Results were likely to vary with particularities of
context; for example, tort law for railroads was not the same as tort
law for hospitals. After a brief introductory chapter on general
concepts, Green breaks the field down into contexts and relations:
"Threats, Insults, Blows, etc.;" "Physicians, Surgeons, Hospitals;"
"Occupancy and Ownership of Land;" "Public Service Companies;"
"Counties, Towns, Cities, Boards;" "Manufacturers, Dealers;" "Traffic
and Transport [subdivided in turn into Railway, Auto, Passengers,
etc.]". 185 This approach had the great virtue of encouraging the readerstudent to appreciate the importance of social context to applications
of law. But unlike Wigmore, it did not give the student the resources
to make comparisons of policies across contexts or to identify larger
background factors at work.
III. REFLECTIONS: THE MOTORS OF CURRICULAR CHANGE
What can we learn from this story of additions and internal
transformations about what causes curricular change? It is obvious
that topicality-the salience of a field of law in the world outside the
school, the legal system (especially the courts) and the profession,
politics and the press-is going to force curricular planners and
casebook writers to pay attention to some subjects, and the lack of
topicality will doom other topics to extinction. Look at the list of
additions above: clearly it tracks pretty closely the changes in the
social world that at the time were thought important and which
attracted a great deal of attention. Thus, poverty law and urban law
became big topics in the 1960s and 1970s. Poor people and cities are
hardly less important now than then, nor their situations less dire;
but they are no longer in fashion. In 1895, Thayer was still thinking
about slavery, the Civil War, and the plight of the Negro. By the early
twentieth century, when lynching, Jim Crow, and disenfranchisement
effectively maintained a racial caste system, the authors of
Constitutional Law books paid no attention to what was happening
under their noses. Their attention revived of course when the NAACP
legal activists, the courts, and the civil rights movements of the
Second Reconstruction changed the rules of the game. The Warren
Court and Civil Rights statutes not only brought civil rights back into
the curriculum, but refocused attention on its pre-history: slavery, the
Reconstruction amendments and legislation, and Redemption. For
example, Plessy v. Ferguson, an entirely unremarkable case at the
time of its decision, became a centerpiece of the canon once Brown v.
185. Id. at 5-1154.
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Board of Education overruled it. Similarly, Lochner v. New York,
apparently not much of a landmark to the law teachers who lived
through it, came to symbolize to the generations of post-ProgressiveNew Deal lawyers the paradigm case of an era of judicial
overreaching. It is quite clear that Constitutional Law casebooks, in
their next editions, will contain large sections on Executive Powers in
emergencies and wartime, while Labor Law is likely to continue its
long slide into oblivion. All courses, one hopes and expects, will be
larded with healthy international components as transactions and
their regulation are globalized.
Simple topicality, however, is not enough to explain how a
subject gets into the canon. Topicality is always naturally filtered
through the perceptual lenses and conceptual preoccupations and
agendas of legal academics. These, it is hardly necessary to point out,
do not always track very closely those of the practicing profession. In
1900, for example, tort law was undergoing what one would not
exaggerate to call a revolution; the massive toll of death and injury
from industrial, railroad, and street railroad accidents met up with an
immigrant bar of plaintiffs lawyers, and the result was the explosion
on state court dockets of personal-injury accident suits. 8 6 As we have
seen, these made virtually no impression at the time on Ames &
Smith, who had other fish to fry, and plenty of English cases on
intentional torts with which to fry them. Even after accident law
muscled its way into torts books under the conceptual rubric of
negligence, it left out entire fields employing many practitionersFederal Employer Liability Act lawsuits and workers' compensation,
to mention only two. For all tort lawyers and their clients-defendants
as well as plaintiffs-the components and calculation of damage
awards is a matter of brute survival, but this topic hardly registers in
torts books until recent years, because there is not enough theory
about damages to make it interesting. It becomes interesting when
economic thinking infiltrates legal thinking, because economics
reorients the whole field around the bottom line as the touchstone of
efficient liability rules.

186. On the rise of personal-injury law, see RANDOLPH BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER:
INJURY AND LAW IN NEW YORK CITY, 1870-1910 (1992) (discussing turn-of-the-century
Americans' changing response to the danger of accidental injury as an indicator of how society
governs itself); EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992) (analyzing the sociolegal process of
disputing, settling and litigating claims involving disputes between individual plaintiffs and
national corporations); JOHN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 59-63 (2004); and Lawrence M.
Friedman, Civil Wrongs: PersonalInjury Law in the Late 19th Century, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 351 (analyzing personal injury actions in the Superior Court of Alameda County, California,
and from the federal district court for Northern California from 1880 to 1900).

2007]

LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM

367

So internal intellectual change-changes in theory-must
account for a good deal of curricular change, though I would guess for
more of the internal transformations than the additions. (Many of the
additions, I can testify from personal experience, come in because of
student pressure to have them taught.) Internal change of course is
not independent of external influence: consider the money the Ford
Foundation spent on clinics and the much larger sums the Olin
18 7
Foundation poured into hiring Law & Economics teachers.
The main entry point for theoretical change, however, is law
teachers' receptivity to outside disciplines, and even more important,
their ability to assimilate them into conventional ways of legal
thinking. Nineteenth-century jurists successfully re-organized the
common law subjects into substantive-law categories imported from
the modernized Roman Law of the continent. Twentieth-century
jurists in turn converted classical private-law into instrumental policy
analysis by assimilating the approaches of the "social law"
movements. The Realists' attempt to integrate law and empirical
social science, as Schlegel has shown, were less successful, though
they left permanent traces in the marginalia-the "Materials," notes,
and back-of-the-book chapters-of casebooks. Of the modern
interdisciplinary movements, Law and Economics has made the most
impact, partly I think because much of its style of thinking was
already latent, albeit in much less rigorous form, in the types of policy
analysis bequeathed by social law and legal realism; it gave lawyers a
more rigorous method of doing what they did already. Once it secured
a beachhead, economic theory has marched on to reorganize entire
fields, especially corporate law.18 8 History has yet to have the scope
and depth of impact of economics, but in some fields, notably
Constitutional Law as we have seen, its influence has been pervasive
and profound.
Interdisciplinary
approaches
have,
however,
affected
scholarship more than teaching, because traditional teaching
materials, and especially the case method, continue to act as a brake
on innovation. One can see the braking effect in the brief survey,
above, of casebooks in two fields. To be sure, the choice of Torts and
Constitutional Law as examples probably somewhat underestimates
changes in teaching methods and approaches. Torts remains wedded
187. Robert Cooter, Address at the Vanderbilt University Law School Symposium: What is
Law and Economics? Why did it Succeed? (Apr. 28-29, 2006). Other examples would be the
funding of international legal studies by the government and Ford Foundation in the 1950s and
of Law & Society studies by the Russell Sage Foundation in the 1950s.
188. Roberta Romano has recently told at length the fascinating story of how the insights of
economists and lawyer economists have colonized and reorganized Corporations as a legal field.
See Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in CorporateLaw, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342 (2005).
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to cases and the case method partly because its status as a required
first-year course, in a curriculum committed to using the first year to
teach common law thinking. Constitutional Law, as we have seen,
early chose as its subject the cases decided by the Supreme Court. In
other subjects like Evidence and Business Transactions, where cases
have always been a clumsy method of teaching legal fields whose
practice is far removed from the appellate bench, "problem" methods
and "planning" methods have for some time been displacing the cases
in instructional materials.
Moreover, even the more traditional courses are showing signs
of restlessness with their case law origins. The tendencies in torts
books to include more materials on statutory changes and alternative
institutional forms is likely to gather steam as "tort reform" shifts
more business out of courts. The new scholarship on "the Constitution
outside the courts," stressing the role of social movements, interest
groups, ideological change, and political alliances in making
constitutional law, is likely to favor the-Brest, Levinson et al. book's
example of bringing in more historical and extra-legal context. The
proliferation of books in the Law Stories series (building on earlier
work of Richard Danzig and A.W. Brian Simpson 81 9) providing context
and background to leading cases is a move in the same direction.
Still, I expect that the case method will continue to dominate
our teaching and teaching materials for some time to come. It works
pretty well within its limited range; students are very attached to it
and tend to grumble and revolt if teachers stray too far from it; only
clinical instruction, with its thrilling combination of real-world clients
and close supervision and guidance, seems to engage students more.
Curricular innovators likely then must focus their attention on
developing casebooks with new kinds of cases, more like the Harvard
Business School cases, situating lawyers and clients and decision
makers in the broader social and institutional contexts of their work.
A final note: one factor in curricular change that is invisible to
the reader of catalogues and casebooks, but nonetheless of paramount
importance, is the presence on a law faculty of a critical cabal who are
willing to band together and take the time to rethink traditional
subjects and prepare new course materials. This was the
indispensable condition for what still looks like the most ambitious
curricular innovations since the initial Harvard reforms: the Legal
Realists' Columbia experiments of the 1920s and the Yale experiments

189. See RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS
ON WELL-KNowN CASES (1978); A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW
(1995).
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of the 1930s. 190 It also helps to explain why some of the boldest
experiments tend to be transitory: the pioneers lose energy and
interest, or are diverted to other things (as the Yale faculty, for
example, were by the New Deal). The reforms that Dean Edward L.
Rubin and his colleagues are planning for Vanderbilt, which sound
both sensible and highly imaginative, will in the last instance rise or
fall on the faculty's energy and commitment, as well as on factors
beyond anyone's control, such as whether they will take among
students, alumni, practitioners and the wider world beyond. I hope
they succeed.

190. On these, see KALMAN and SCHLEGEL, supra note 22.

